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PROPERTY LAW—LANDLORD-TENANT LAW—THE IRON TRIANGLE OF
RESIDENTIAL LEASES: LANDLORDS, TENANTS, AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN
AMERICA’S LAST STATE WITHOUT IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY.
ALEXANDER APARTMENTS V. CITY OF LITTLE ROCK, 60CV-15-6339 (2017).
I. INTRODUCTION
Last among the states in its absence of an implied duty in residential
leases for landlords to repair and maintain1 their properties in habitable
condition,2 Arkansas carries forward a tradition from the Middle Ages3 in
which tenants were expected, equipped, and qualified to work their rented
lands to generate income and conduct repairs necessary to continue earning
a living.4 In the Information Age,5 residential tenants are no longer equipped
or qualified to work rented lands for income,6 instead using their rented
residences as refuges from harm. Beyond a mere embarrassment for
Arkansas, the absence of what is known as an “implied warranty of
habitability” places undue burden on tenants with carryover effects that
undermine property values,7 increase public health and related costs,8 and
lower employee productivity.9
1. Order Granting in Part & Den. in Part Tenant Intervenors’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J.
Against Alexander Apartments, LLC, Alexander Apartments, LLC v. City of Little Rock,
60CV-15-6339 (2017) [hereinafter Alexander Order for Intervenors].
2. Symposium, Ark. Non-Legislative Commission on the Study of Landlord-Tenant
Law, Report, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 739, 764 (2013) [hereinafter The
Commission].
3. Middle Ages, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
Middle%20Ages (last visited Dec. 29, 2018).
4. Tom G. Geurts, The Historical Development of the Lease in Residential Real Estate,
32 REAL EST. L.J. 356, 356 (2004).
5. Information
Age,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/Information%20Age (last visited Dec. 29, 2018).
6. Lynn Foster, The Hands of The State: The Failure to Vacate Statute and Residential
Tenants’ Rights in Arkansas, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 35 (2013).
7. See Paul Emrath, Impact of Home Building and Remodeling on the U.S. Economy 1–
5 (May 1, 2014), https://www.nahb.org/en/research/housing-economics/housings-economicimpact/impact-of-home-building-and-remodeling-on-the-u-s--economy.aspx. The inference is
clear: Remodeling increases home and property values, but allowing homes to fall into
disrepair has the opposite effect.
8. David E. Jacobs et al., The Relationships of Housing and Population Health: A 30year Retrospective Analysis, 117 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 597, 603 (2009), https://www.ncbi
.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2679604/pdf/ehp-117-597.pdf.
9. See id. at 602; Arindrajit Dube, Eric Freeman, & Michael Reich, Employee
Replacement Costs, INST. FOR RES. ON LAB. & EMP. U.C. (2010), http://irle.
berkeley.edu/files/2010/Employee-Replacement-Costs.pdf. This note argues, among other

117

118

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

In health care, the iron triangle of access, quality, and cost are equal
priorities that, when balanced, optimize the system.10 A similar triad of
interests exists in residential leases through the relationships between
landlords, tenants, and economic policy. Where the interests of one group
are skewed against the others, inefficiencies undermine the entire
relationship. This note argues in favor of the August 9, 2017 order on an
issue of first impression by the Pulaski County Circuit Court, which held
that the City of Little Rock’s (“the City”) housing code effectively operates
as an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases.11 This
interpretation of the housing code compliance requirements will provide
some relief for Pulaski County tenants, advancing a portion of Arkansas law
from its current last-place position and into alignment with every other
state.12 The possibility exists that rent rates could increase13 if landlords are
required to maintain rental units in accordance with applicable housing
codes. However, the Arkansas economy will benefit overall from a reduced
public health burden14 and related economic benefits.15 Furthermore, any
increase in rent would likely be marginal, and the benefit substantially
outweighs the cost.16
This note advocates for the interpretation that the housing code creates
an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases and further
advocates for a more comprehensive and predictable statutory solution that
implements the Revised Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant Act
(RURLTA).17 Recognizing this interpretation and codifying it in statutory
form will bring Arkansas in line and follow the recommendations of a
comprehensive 2012 Arkansas legislative study,18 which coincides with
every other American jurisdiction.19
Arkansas courts should recognize the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s
interpretation that the housing code is an implied part of residential lease
things, that substandard housing detrimentally impacts health, which burdens businesses and
the economy through reduced productivity and increased employee replacement cost.
10. WILLIAM L. KISSICK, MEDICINE’S DILEMMAS: INFINITE NEEDS VERSUS FINITE
RESOURCES 2–3 (1994).
11. Alexander Order for Intervenors, supra note 1, at 8.
12. Id. at 6.
13. Why is Arkansas the Only State in U.S. Without this Law?, KNWA NEWS (Oct. 16,
2014),
http://www.nwahomepage.com/news/knwa/why-is-arkansas-the-only-state-in-uswithout-this-law/146701136.
14. Fact Sheet: Health and Housing, ARK. CTR. FOR HEALTH IMPROVEMENT (Mar. 2017),
http://www.achi.net/docs/462/.
15. Id.
16. See infra Section III.B.
17. See infra Section III.A.
18. The Commission, supra note 2, at 773–74.
19. See infra Section III.A.2.
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contracts, violations of which create private rights of action for tenants, and
should apply it within their respective jurisdictions. Furthermore, appellate
decisions should affirm this interpretation and apply the standard to all
jurisdictions with housing codes in Arkansas. Housing codes should be
enforced in residential leases in Arkansas to provide tenants some protection
under lease contracts and protect landlords’ investments. Implementing a
statutory implied warranty of habitability that expands existing Arkansas
landlord-tenant law to include the landlord duties under the RURLTA would
afford greater market predictability and economic benefit to the State while
also ensuring basic protections for tenants.20
Part II of this note begins with a background of landlord-tenant law in
Arkansas, including developments with the implied warranty of
habitability.21 Next, Part III discusses the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s
order construing housing codes as an implied warranty of habitability in
residential leases and the scope of the order.22 Finally, the note considers the
implied warranty of habitability from an economic perspective, analyzing
research data and comparable situations as evidenced by corporate reactions
to social issues.23 The final section incorporates additional public policy
considerations, including the extreme imbalance in the landlord-tenant
relationship that places undue burden on tenants, exposes landlords to risk,
and leaves Arkansas in last place in advancement from an agrarian society.
II. BACKGROUND
Landlord-tenant law has a long history that can be traced back to
England in the Middle Ages.24 This section gives a brief overview of the
original thinking behind landlord-tenant law and traces it through the
twentieth century. With the contextual history outlined, the section
continues with context for the development of the implied warranty of
habitability, including its expansion throughout the United States and its
history in Arkansas. The section ends with a case history of Alexander
Apartments, LLC v. City of Little Rock.
A.

Landlord-Tenant Law: A Brief History

Throughout the Middle Ages, tenants were expected, equipped, and
qualified to work their rented lands to generate income and conduct repairs

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section II.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section III.B.
See Geurts, supra note 4.
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necessary to continue earning a living.25 These ancient leases were both
residential and commercial in nature. As our society began to move from its
generalized agrarian roots, tenants began to specialize in trades or other
advanced roles and gradually lost the skills and time necessary to conduct
their own repairs.26 As society moved into the contemporary era, residential
tenants no longer worked land to earn income as they ventured further away
from their leased properties to carry out their specialized work.27 In contrast
with ancient leases, the contemporary leases contemplated in this note are
residential in nature and not commercial.
In the 1970s, laws began to catch up to changes in the expectations on
tenants and their relationships with rented property and landlords.28 In a
landmark federal case that recognized the fundamental shift into our
contemporary, specialized society, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held in Javins v. First National Realty that
“adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure
windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance” were
implied components of a residential lease.29 The Javins court held that “the
old no-repair rule cannot coexist with the obligations imposed on the
landlord by a typical modern housing code, and must be abandoned in favor
of an implied warranty of habitability.”30
One of the earliest examples of a court recognizing an “implied
warranty of habitability” was in Lemle v. Breeden.31 The Lemle court noted
that the tenant discovered rats not present during a move-in inspection,32
which the court found to be in violation of the contractual relationship.33
Popularized as a precedent in Javins,34 the notion of a landlord’s implied
contractual duty to repair and maintain leased residential premises was
followed by a string of other jurisdictions,35 leading to the creation of a
25. Geurts, supra note 4, at 356.
26. Id.
27. Foster, supra note 6, at 35.
28. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty, 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Kline v.
Burns, 276 A.2d 248 (N.H. 1971); Hinson v. Delis, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. App. 1972);
Gillete v. Anderson, 282 N.E.2d 149 (Ill. App. 1972); Bos. Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293
N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
29. 428 F.2d at 1074.
30. Id. at 1076–77.
31. 462 P.2d 470 (Haw. 1969); J. Clifford McKinney, II, Caveat Who?: A Review of The
Landlord/Tenant Relationship in The Context of Injuries and Maintenance Obligations, 35 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1049, 1067 (2013).
32. Lemle, 462 P.2d at 471.
33. Id. at 476.
34. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074.
35. See, e.g., Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978); Green v. Superior
Court of S.F., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168 (1974); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill.2d 351,
280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Bos. Hous.
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uniform law. In 1972, the Uniform Law Commission attempted to evenly
balance the interests of landlords and tenants in the Uniform Residential
Landlord-Tenant Act (URLTA).36 Twenty-one states have enacted the
URLTA.37 An overwhelming majority of the states that have not enacted the
URLTA have nonetheless created statutory protections for tenants.38 Some
of the statutory protections are modeled after the original URLTA and
others are based on the nuanced needs of states where they are enacted.39
Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich.
App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972). See also ALA. CODE § 35-9A-204 (West, Westlaw
through 2018); ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.100 (West, Westlaw through 2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33-1324 (West, Westlaw through 2018); CALIF. CIV. CODE § 1941, et seq. (West,
Westlaw through 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-503 (West, Westlaw through 2018);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-7 (West, Westlaw through 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25 §
5305 (West, Westlaw through 2018); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 14 § 301 (West, Westlaw through
2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.51 (West, Westlaw though 2018); GA. CODE ANN., § 44-7-13
(West, Westlaw though 2018); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-42 (West, Westlaw through
2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-320 (West, Westlaw through 2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-318-5 (West, Westlaw through 2018); IOWA CODE ANN. § 562A.15 (West, Westlaw through
2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2553 (West, Westlaw through 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
383.595 (West, Westlaw through 2018); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2691 (West, Westlaw
through 2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 6021 (West, Westlaw through 2018); MD.
CODE ANN. REAL PROP. § 8-211 (West, Westlaw through 2018); 105 Mass. Code Regs. §
410:351 (West, Westlaw through 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.139 (West, Westlaw
through 2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504B.161 (West, Westlaw through 2018); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 89-8-23 (West, Westlaw through 2018); MO. ANN. STAT. § 441.234 (West, Westlaw
through 2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-303 (West, Westlaw through 2018); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 76-1419 (West, Westlaw through 2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.290
(West, Westlaw through 2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-A:14 (West, Westlaw through
2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-20 (West, Westlaw through 2018); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §
235-b (McKinney, Westlaw through 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-42 (West, Westlaw
through 2018); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-16-13.1 (West, Westlaw through 2018); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (West, Westlaw through 2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 118
(West, Westlaw through 2018); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.320 (West, Westlaw through
2018); 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-18-22 (West, Westlaw through 2018); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 27-40-440 (West, Westlaw through 2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-32-8 (West, Westlaw
through 2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-304 (West, Westlaw through 2017); TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 92.052 (West, Westlaw through 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-22-4 (West,
Westlaw through 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 4457 (West, Westlaw through 2018); VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-248.43 (West, Westlaw through 2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060
(West, Westlaw through 2018); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-6-30 (West, Westlaw through 2018);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West, Westlaw through 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1203
(West, Westlaw through 2018); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Pugh v.
Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1978).
36. See generally, UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1972), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/residential%20landlord%20and%20tenant/
urlta%201974.pdf.
37. Foster, supra note 6, at 36.
38. Id. at 36–37.
39. Id. at 37.
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The URLTA originally required landlords to comply with housing
codes related to health and safety; maintain premises in a fit and habitable
condition; keep common areas clean and safe; maintain utility infrastructure;
provide for garbage removal; and provide water, hot water, and heat.40 The
uniform law was developed with balance between the interests of tenants
and landlords in mind.41 In 2015, the Uniform Law Commission revised the
URLTA, created the RURLTA, and added requirements for landlords to
provide for “effective waterproofing and weather protection of the roof and
exterior walls;”42 reasonable measures to control vermin and prevent
exposure to hazardous substances; “floors, doors, windows, walls, ceilings,
stairways, and . . . railings” in good repair; and working locks; safety
equipment; and recycling receptacles.43 These revisions reflect
contemporary recognition of the economic44 and environmental benefits45 of
improving energy efficiency, promoting factors that contribute to health and
safety, and reducing waste.46
B.

Arkansas Landlord-Tenant Law

Arkansas remains the lone torchbearer in carrying on the ancient
tradition of casting the entire burden to repair and maintain on the tenant
while relieving the landlord of responsibility.47 In 2007, the Arkansas
General Assembly enacted the pro-landlord provisions of the URLTA but
omitted the tenant-protection provisions.48 Every other state has enacted
some form of tenant protection and many have enacted some form of
landlord protection, but Arkansas sits alone in its position of protecting only
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. REVISED UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 302 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/residential%20landlord%20and%20tenant/
RURLTA%202015_Final%20Act_2017mar30.pdf.
43. Id.
44. Packaging and Recycling, U.S. CHAMBER COM. FOUND. (2017), https://www.
uschamberfoundation.org/initiative/packaging-and-recycling.
45. RECYCLING ECONOMIC INFORMATION (REI) REPORT, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY (2017), https://www.epa.gov/smm/recycling-economic-information-rei-report.
46. Benefits of Recycling, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & NAT’L INSTS. OF
HEALTH ENVTL. MGMT. SYS., https://nems.nih.gov/environmental-programs/Pages/Benefitsof-Recycling.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2018).
47. Alexander Order for Intervenors, supra note 1, at 2.
48. See Arkansas Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007, No. 1004, sec. 1, 2007 Ark.
Acts 5110, 5113 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-101, et seq. (West, Westlaw through
2018)). See also Ginny Monk, ‘Habitable’ Not in Rules for State Landlords, ARK. ONLINE
(Jul. 8, 2018, 4:30 AM), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2018/jul/08/habitable-not-inrules-for-state-landlo/ (articulating a more comprehensive history of attempts to enact tenant
protections in Arkansas).
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landlords.49 Although the initial weight of the push to bring landlord-tenant
law in line with the other areas of the law that have recognized the balance
of interests requisite in an economically healthy society was made following
the creation of the URLTA,50 recent attention from a wide variety of
domestic and international news outlets, independent research foundations,
and human rights organizations has focused on Arkansas’s position, which
has been left behind by the rest of the country.51
In 2011, the Arkansas General Assembly created by statute a nonlegislative commission to study the state of landlord-tenant laws in
Arkansas.52 The Commission consisted of members “appointed by the
Governor, legislators, [professors from each of] the two Arkansas law
schools, [and] the Arkansas Bar Association.”53 The Commission also
included representatives from the Arkansas Realtor’s Association, Arkansas
Bankers’ Association, Landlords’ Association of Arkansas, and Arkansas
Affordable Housing Association.54 The Commission’s conclusions were
consistent with much of what has been covered by the various authors noted
previously, including that Arkansas stands alone and is considerably out of
balance with other states regarding the state of its landlord-tenant laws.55

49. Alexander Order for Intervenors, supra note 1, at 8.
50. See David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99
CAL. L. REV. 389 (2011).
51. Monk, supra note 48; Ron Wood, Renters Have Few Rights Under Arkansas Law,
ARK. ONLINE (May 7, 2017), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2017/may/07/rentershave-few-rights-under-arkansas-/; John Pacenti, Renters Beware: What’s That Smell?, FOX
BUS. (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/renters-beware-whats-that-smell;
Zaneta Lowe, Renters Have Few Rights in Arkansas, WREG NEWS (Feb. 5, 2015, 10:31
AM), http://wreg.com/2015/02/05/renters-have-few-rights-in-arkansas/; Eli Hager, Can You
Go to Jail for Not Paying Rent?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 16, 2015, 5:42 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/16/can-you-go-to-jail-for-not-paying-rent; Janet
Portman, Breaking Your Lease When Roaches Go Wild, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 19, 2010),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-11-19/classified/ct-mre-1121-renting20101119_1_landlord-roaches-habitable-premises; Christof Putzel, In Arkansas, a Real
Estate Loophole That Lets Landlords Neglect Renters, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 2, 2016),
http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/2016/2/in-arkansas-a-real-estateloophole-that-lets-landlords-neglect-renters.html; Spencer Chumbley & Mark Scialla,
Arkansas: Worst Place to Rent in America, VICE NEWS (June 25, 2014, 11:25 AM),
https://news.vice.com/video/arkansas-the-worst-place-to-rent-in-america; Arkansas: Tenants
Face Prosecution Over Rent Problems, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 5, 2013, 12:45 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/05/arkansas-tenants-face-prosecution-over-rent-problems
[hereinafter Tenants Face Prosecution]; 10 Things Your Landlord Won’t Tell You, N.Y.
POST, (June 15, 2014, 5:22 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/06/15/10-things-your-landlordwont-tell-you/ [hereinafter 10 Things Your Landlord Won’t Tell You].
52. See The Commission, supra note 2.
53. Foster, supra note 6, at 3.
54. Id.
55. The Commission, supra note 2, at 2.
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Scholarly Research and Public Attention on Arkansas LandlordTenant Law

A growing body of legal,56 public health,57 and economic research58
joins an already expansive list of public interest59 and media reporting60 on
the subject of the detrimental impacts resulting from the imbalance between
landlord and tenant interests. Scholarly legal writing from around the
country continues to analyze the absence of an implied warranty of
habitability in Arkansas.61 For example, the absence of an implied warranty
of habitability has been juxtaposed with the existence of Arkansas’s failure
to vacate and criminal eviction statutes.62 Another recent article discusses
the doctrine of caveat lessee and the obligations currently imposed on
landlords and tenants in Arkansas.63 An article by a Louisiana State
University law professor includes comparative foreign examples for
implementing the RURLTA.64 Yet another article by a Seton Hall Law
School professor discusses the continued existence of the implied warranty
of habitability and the current state of the law in the context of its
development through case law in New Jersey.65 This article is particularly
relevant in the context of this note because, as one of the earliest adopters of
56. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 6; McKinney, supra note 31; Melissa T. Lonegrass, A
Second Chance for Innovation—Foreign Inspiration for the Revised Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 905 (2013); Super, supra note 50;
Marshall Prettyman, Landlord Protection Law Revisited: The Amendments to the Arkansas
Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 18-17-101 et seq., 35 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1031 (2013).
57. See, e.g., Ashley E. Bachelder et al., Health Complaints Associated with Poor Rental
Housing Conditions in Arkansas: The Only State Without a Landlord’s Implied Warranty of
Habitability, 4 FRONTIERS PUB. HEALTH 1 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC5120100/pdf/fpubh-04-00263.pdf.
58. See, e.g., MIKE ROYS, MAGGIE DAVIDSON, SIMON NICOL, DAVID ORMANDY, & PETER
AMBROSE, THE REAL COST OF POOR HOUSING 43 (2010), https://www.hud.gov
/sites/documents/REAL_COST_POOR_HOUSING.PDF.
59. Pay the Rent or Face Arrest: Abusive Impacts of Arkansas’s Draconian Evictions
Law, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 4, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/02/04/pay-rent-orface-arrest/abusive-impacts-arkansass-draconian-evictions-law [hereinafter Pay the Rent].
60. See, e.g., Monk, supra note 48; Wood, supra note 51; Pacenti, supra note 51; Lowe,
supra note 51; Hager, supra note 51; Portman, supra note 51; Putzel, supra note 51;
Chumbley & Scialla, supra note 51; Tenants Face Prosecution, supra note 51; 10 Things
Your Landlord Won’t Tell You, supra note 51.
61. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 6, at 3; Paula A. Franzese, Abbott Gorin, & David J.
Guzik, The Implied Warranty of Habitability Lives: Making Real the Promise of LandlordTenant Reform, 68 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2016); McKinney, supra note 31, at 1069; Lonegrass,
supra note 56, at 905; Super, supra note 50, at 394.
62. Foster, supra note 6, at 20.
63. McKinney, supra note 31, at 1049.
64. Lonegrass, supra note 56, at 916–22.
65. Franzese, Gorin, & Guzik, supra note 61, at 1.
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an implied warranty of habitability interpreted in case law,66 the New Jersey
Supreme Court offers a potential template for its adoption in Arkansas.
The disparity between Arkansas’s laws and the rest of the country has
been gaining attention in national press67 and among international groups.68
Notably, an international group that monitors atrocities around the world,
including places such as Afghanistan, Russia, Rwanda, and Syria,69 reported
on the status of Arkansas’s landlord-tenant laws in 2013.70
2.

Impact of Public Pressure

This attention has placed pressure on lawmakers and elected officials in
Arkansas, leading to several attempts toward bringing Arkansas up to the
basic nationwide standards included in the RURLTA.71 As recently as 2017,
competing bills were introduced in the Arkansas General Assembly. In one
bill, sponsored by state Representative Laurie Rushing, implied quality
standards were to be applied to residential leases, including requirements for
landlords to maintain working heating, cooling, electrical, potable water,
and sewage systems in addition to a “functioning roof and building
envelope.”72 However, this bill gave landlords complete discretion over
whether the standards were met, failed to include enforcement measures,
and after its last amendment, actually deprived tenants of the meager rights
they have under constructive eviction.73 The bill failed sine die in committee
in the Arkansas Senate.74 Another another bill, sponsored by state
Representative Warwick Sabin in the same legislative session, included a
comprehensive list of provisions that reflected the landlord obligations
under the URLTA that were excluded from the 2007 enactment by the

66. Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 251 A.2d 268, 276–77 (N.J. 1969).
67. Monk, supra note 48; Wood, supra note 51; Pacenti, supra note 51; Lowe, supra
note 51; Hager, supra note 51; Portman, supra note 51; Putzel, supra note 51; Chumbley &
Scialla, supra note 51; Tenants Face Prosecution, supra note 51; 10 Things Your Landlord
Won’t Tell You, supra note 51.
68. Pay the Rent, supra note 59.
69. Publications, HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/publications (last visited Dec.
16, 2017).
70. Pay the Rent, supra note 59; Arkansas: Tenants Face Prosecution Over Rent
Problems, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 5, 2013, 12:45 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013
/02/05/arkansas-tenants-face-prosecution-over-rent-problems.
71. See, e.g., H.B. 1166, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017); H.B. 2135, 91st
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017).
72. H.B. 1166, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017) (The bill failed sine die in
Senate committee.).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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Arkansas legislature.75 The provisions included were substantially identical
to those required under the URLTA. Critically, Representative Sabin’s bill
specified the landlord’s rights that accompanied the implied duties and
provided procedures and remedies available to tenants in the event of
landlord oversight.76 Balancing the interests of landlords and tenants is at the
heart of the failure of these bills.
On one hand, landlords point to the risks they take in leasing their
properties, which may be damaged far beyond the dollar amount of the
security deposit.77 On the other hand, tenants and tenant groups point to the
insecurity they face at the mercy of landlords,78 who can have the ability to
unilaterally evict them for even minor infractions with no corresponding
recourse of their own.79 Tenants may also be effectively forced, because of
their options limited by income or credit, to live in uninhabitable conditions
with no legal recourse.
One of the common criticisms against implementing the tenant-friendly
portions of the RURLTA is the increased risk exposure for landlords, who
are able to provide a market of among the lowest rent costs in the United
States.80 The argument holds that bringing Arkansas landlords in line with
their interstate peers will increase their overhead costs, thus increasing rent
prices, and put Arkansas landlords at the mercy of unscrupulous tenants.81
However, the argument presumes that the market will not level itself by
attracting scrupulous tenants to improved units and implies that landlords
artificially control rent prices at their tenants’ expense. It also assumes that
all Arkansas landlords offer substandard housing requiring substantial
expense to bring it to a habitable standard. Furthermore, the Arkansas
General Assembly enacted a statute that expressly limits landlord liability in
tort.82 The effect of this statutory limit on liability in tort for landlords83 is
that most tort liability passes on to tenants, who are held to premises liability
standards for injuries sustained by licensees and invitees.84 Therefore,
75. H.B. 2135, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017) (The bill failed sine die in
House committee.).
76. Id.
77. See Alan Schwartz, Justice and the Law of Contracts: A Case for the Traditional
Approach, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 107 (1986).
78. Pay the Rent, supra note 59.
79. Super, supra note 50, at 394.
80. The Cheapest U.S. Cities for Renters: #14. Little Rock Arkansas, CBS NEWS (Sept.
27, 2016, 6:11 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/media/cheapest-rent-housing-us-cities/8/.
81. Laura Kelton, The Top Ten Ways to Annoy Your Landlord, U. OF TENN. AT
CHATTANOOGA: THE LOOP (Sept. 19, 2009), https://blog.utc.edu/TheLoop/2009/09/19/thetop-ten-ways-to-annoy-your-landlord/.
82. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-110 (West, Westlaw through 2018).
83. Id.
84. Id.
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minimal risk exposure exists for landlords, whose liability is limited to
circumstances where damages result from lease contract breach85 unless the
landlord agrees to maintain and repair and fails to perform in a reasonable
manner.86
C.

Case Summary: Alexander Apartments, LLC v. City of Little Rock

Alexander Apartments, LLC, owns an apartment complex consisting of
141 units, which has been cited by the City for numerous housing code
violations since the complex was purchased by Alexander Apartments, LLC,
in March 2014.87 On December 21, 2015, the Little Rock Fire Department
issued a notice that it intended to terminate utility services to Alexander
Apartments following repeated violations of the City’s ordinances
pertaining to housing codes88 resulting in immediate threats to health and
safety of residents.89 According to the Little Rock Fire Department,
terminating utility services meant the apartments were no longer habitable.90
Later that same day, in response to a motion for a temporary restraining
order against the City from Alexander Apartments,91 the Pulaski County
Circuit Court ruled that it lacked sufficient jurisdiction to interfere with the
fire department’s action.92 After the hearing, notice was placed on the door
of each of the residents, requiring the tenants to vacate by 5:00 p.m. on
December 28, 2015, because of the pending termination of utility services.93
1.

Tenant Intervention

The tenants intervened in the ongoing litigation between the City and
Alexander Apartments.94 The intervenors cited numerous claims against the
City, including violations of due process and federal and state laws.95 The
tenant intervenors also requested a temporary restraining order to prevent
injury in the form of losing access to their rented residences during the
85. McKinney, supra note 31.
86. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-110 (West, Westlaw through 2018).
87. Third Party Compl. & Mot. for TRO at 2, Alexander Apartments, LLC v. City of
Little Rock, No. 60CV-15-6339 (Dec. 22, 2016) [hereinafter Complaint and TRO].
88. LITTLE ROCK, ARK., MUN. CODE § 8 (2018), https://library.municode.com/AR/
little_rock/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=COOR_CH8BUBURE.
89. Complaint and TRO, supra note 87.
90. Id.
91. See generally, Mot. for TRO, Alexander Apartments, LLC v. City of Little Rock,
No. 60CV-15-6339 (Dec. 21, 2015).
92. Complaint and TRO, supra note 87.
93. Id. at 3.
94. See generally id.
95. Id. at 3.
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winter and in a period of time that would have included a major holiday.96
The intervenors also cited numerous claims against Alexander Apartments,
including breach of contract,97 breach of the implied covenant of quiet
enjoyment,98 conversion,99 negligence,100 and breach of the implied warranty
of habitability.101
The intervenors filed a motion for partial summary judgment against
Alexander Apartments on the issue of the intervenors’ claim that the
minimum standards included in the City’s housing code are implicitly
included as part of residential lease agreements and thereby creates an
implied warranty of habitability in those residential lease agreements.102 The
motion included two possibilities: (1) “Local laws or ordinances establishing
minimum standards of habitability must be read into residential leases, and
by implication create a warranty of habitability in residential leases which is
measured by the standards set out in those local law[s] or ordinances;
and”103 (2) “[t]hat a general implied warranty of habitability exists in all
residential lease agreements in the State of Arkansas, regardless of the
existence of local laws or ordinances.”104
2.

Two Theories for Finding Minimum Standards in Existing Law

On the first possibility, that local laws or ordinances establish
minimum standards of habitability that must be read into residential leases,
the court began by examining the City’s Housing Code (“Code”).105 The
Code applies to all leased properties irrespective of when they were
“constructed, altered or repaired.”106 The Code requires buildings to be
maintained, safe, and sanitary, and it further stipulates that noncompliant
dwellings cannot be let or sublet.107 The court noted that the Code includes
minimum standards that “include sanitary facilities, hot and cold water
supply, water heating facilities, heating facilities, cooking and heating
96. Id. at 5.
97. Id. at 6.
98. Complaint and TRO, supra note 87, at 6.
99. Id. at 7.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 8.
102. See generally Mot. for Partial Summ. J. Against Alexander Apartments, LLC,
Alexander Apartments, LLC v. City of Little Rock, No. 60CV-15-6339 (Aug. 23, 2016).
103. Alexander Order for Intervenors, supra note 1, at 1.
104. Id. at 2.
105. Id. at 5.
106. LITTLE ROCK, ARK., MUN. CODE § 8-330 (2018), https://library.municode.com/AR
/little_rock/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=COOR_CH8BUBURE_ARTVHOCO_DIV1
GE_S8-330SCCO.
107. Id. § 8-401.
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equipment, . . . garbage disposal facilities[,]108 . . . [l]ight and ventilation[,]109
. . . [e]lectrical systems[,]110 . . . dwelling space,”111 and structural
requirements.112
3.

Pulaski County Circuit Court Granted Summary Judgment

Considering the overwhelming weight of authority from other
jurisdictions throughout the United States, the court pointed to court
decisions from around the country in which the minimum standards in
housing codes have been interpreted as implied by operation of law in
residential housing contracts.113 In Javins, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the District of
Columbia housing code created a privately enforceable duty and “that the
basic validity of every housing contract depended upon substantial
compliance with the housing code at the beginning of the lease term.”114 In
issuing its order granting summary judgment, the Pulaski County Circuit
Court acknowledged the long-held view of the Arkansas Supreme Court that
laws in existence at the time when contracts are made and performed enter
into and form part of those contracts.115 Additionally, the court pointed to
the Arkansas Supreme Court’s position that parties are presumed to contract
with existing laws in mind.116 Here, the court noted that the City’s Code in
effect at the time the tenant intervenors’ leases were entered included
minimum standards. Therefore, those requirements formed part of the lease
contracts between the tenants and Alexander Apartments.117 The ruling is
entirely consistent with the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit’s ruling in Javins and the nationwide trend toward
balancing the rights of tenants and landlords.118

108. Id. § 8-403.
109. Id. § 8-404.
110. Id. § 8-405
111. Id. § 8-406.
112. LITTLE ROCK, ARK., MUN. CODE §§ 8-421 to -435 (2018),
https://library.municode.com/AR/little_rock/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=COOR_CH8
BUBURE_ARTVHOCO_DIV3MIST_PTBSTRE_S8-421FOUN.
113. Alexander Order for Intervenors, supra note 1, at 6 (citing Javins v. First Nat’l
Realty, 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Kline v. Burns, 276 A.2d 248 (N.H. 1971); Hinson
v. Delis, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. App. 1972); Gillete v. Anderson, 282 N.E.2d 149 (Ill. App.
1972); Bos. Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973); King v. Moorehead,
495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)).
114. Id. at 7 (citing Javins, 428 F.2d 1071).
115. Id. at 8 (citing Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 61 S.W.2d 686 (1933)).
116. Id. (citing Ellison v. Tubb, 295 Ark. 312, 749 S.W.2d 650 (1988)).
117. Id.
118. See supra Section II.A.
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The Arkansas General Assembly Bears Responsibility for
Implementing an Implied Warranty of Habitability

On the second possibility, whether a general implied warranty of
habitability exists throughout Arkansas irrespective of local ordinances, the
court noted Arkansas appellate decisions,119 which have consistently upheld
the doctrine of caveat lessee in lease contracts.120 The court noted the
Arkansas Supreme Court’s reluctance to establish a warranty of habitability
through its powers, deferring the decision to the Arkansas General
Assembly.121 The court also noted the General Assembly’s enactment of a
statute that eliminates the possibility of tort liability for landlords’ liability
to tenants or tenants’ invitees proximately caused by defects or disrepair on
a landlord’s leased property.122 Furthermore, the court acknowledged the
2007 enactment of the landlord-friendly portions of the URLTA, noting that
the pro-tenant provisions had been removed and that the 2011 NonLegislative Commission on the Study of Landlord-Tenant Law had
recommended creating implied warranty of habitability in Arkansas law.123
In acknowledging previous appellate decisions, the circuit court wrote
“Arkansas is the only state without a general warranty of habitability in all
residential lease agreements.”124
III. ARGUMENT
Although the implied warranty of habitability has been considered
from various angles in other states for more than fifty years, the concept that
housing codes constitute implied portions of residential leases is an issue of
first impression in Arkansas.125 This section considers this first issue in an
Arkansas court and weighs the health and economic impacts of
implementing the implied warranty of habitability in Arkansas.
A.

Impact as an Issue of First Impression

The Pulaski County Circuit Court’s order establishes that the minimum
standards included in the City’s housing code forms part of residential lease
119. Id. at 3 (citing Hadder v. Heritage Hill Manor, Inc., 2016 Ark. App. 303, 495 S.W.3d
628; Thomas v. Stewart, 347 Ark. 33, 60 S.W.3d 415 (2001); Propst v. McNeill, 326 Ark.
623, 932 S.W.2d 766 (1996)).
120. Alexander Order for Intervenors, supra note 1, at 3.
121. Id. (citing Thomas, 347 Ark. 33, 60 S.W.3d 415; Propst, 326 Ark. 623, 932 S.W.2d
766).
122. Id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-110 (West 2016)).
123. Id. at 4.
124. Id.
125. Alexander Order for Intervenors, supra note 1, at 5.
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agreements and thereby creates an implied warranty of habitability in those
residential lease agreements.126 This is an issue of first impression in
Arkansas. Arkansas circuit courts only carry persuasive weight and not
precedential authority in other Arkansas counties. Therefore, other
jurisdictions must hear a case with similar facts before deciding on the issue
and either agreeing or disagreeing with the Twelfth Division’s
interpretation. However, appellate courts may agree with the order and
conclude that the interpretation applies to all jurisdictions in Arkansas under
contract theory, merely requiring them to enforce existing housing codes
and giving tenants a private right of action.
Approximately 44% of housing units in Little Rock, Arkansas, are
rental units, which means that more than 40,000 of the city’s 91,288 housing
units are rentals.127 Statewide, more than 34% of housing units are rental
units, which translates to nearly 465,000 of Arkansas’s 1,354,762 housing
units.128 With an average of 2.53 people per household statewide,129
approximately 1,000,000 people live in rental housing in Arkansas and more
than 100,000 of Little Rock residents live in rental units. These 1,000,000
Arkansans, who comprise more than 34% of the State’s population, are the
only renters in the United States living without basic guarantees of habitable
housing.130 The unimplemented landlord responsibility provisions of the
RURLTA, when combined with the tenant responsibilities, offer the most
balanced guidance between the interests of landlords and tenants.
1.

Health Impact of Unstandardized Housing on Arkansas Citizens

Feces and raw sewage on the floor,131 a dead cat,132 mold,133 broken
smoke detectors,134 and bed bugs135 are just some examples of actual

126. Id. at 8.
127. Quick Facts: Little Rock, Arkansas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2016), https://www.
census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/littlerockcityarkansas/PST045216.
128. Quick Facts: Arkansas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2016), https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/AR.
129. Id.
130. Alexander Order for Intervenors, supra note 1, at 8; Monk, supra note 48; Wood,
supra note 51; Pacenti supra note 51; Lowe, supra note 51; Hager, supra note 51; Portman,
supra note 51; Putzel, supra note 51; Chumbley & Scialla, supra note 51; Tenants Face
Prosecution, supra note 51; 10 Things Your Landlord Won’t Tell You, supra note 51.
131. Jason Pederson, Alexander Apartments, KATV NEWS (Nov. 14, 2014), http://katv
.com/community/7-on-your-side/alexander-apartments.
132. Chelsea Boozer, Little Rock Held Liable for Eviction Damages; Judge Says City’s
2015 Order to Leave Apartments Violated Constitution, ARK. ONLINE (Dec. 9, 2017, 4:30
AM), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2017/dec/09/lr-held-liable-for-eviction-damages201/.
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problems not only reported by tenants but also observed by housing
inspectors in Arkansas.136 As repulsive as these problems can be to current
and potential tenants,137 their detrimental effects on human health can lead to
serious problems, including respiratory ailments, headaches, high blood
pressure, and bites or infections138 in addition to the more difficult to
quantify impacts of living under stressful conditions with no way to leave.139
A University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences study compared the
substandard housing conditions with incidences of preventable but serious
health issues.140 Out of 951 Arkansas renters surveyed, more than one-third
reported unresolved repair issues with their landlords and one-quarter of
those reported experiencing health problems related to their housing
conditions.141 In the study, Hispanic tenants were 51% more likely to face
repair problems and were more likely to face a health issue than their white
counterparts.142
Scholarly research suggests that the elderly are more sensitive to their
environments compared with younger people,143 possibly putting elderly
tenants at even greater risk. Tragically, children are at the greatest risk from
environmental hazards and face exposure-related negative outcomes such as
“growth retardation, diminished IQ, precocious puberty, microcephaly, and
diminished lung volume.”144 As the economy continues to recover from the
housing market crash, people fifty-five and older have turned to the rental

133. Jonathan Rozelle, Mold in Apartment Making Resident Sick, ARK. MATTERS (Feb.
15, 2017, 7:40 PM), http://www.arkansasmatters.com/news/local-news/mold-in-apartmentmaking-resident-sick/657141628.
134. Boozer, supra note 132.
135. Why is Arkansas the Only State in U.S. Without this Law?, supra note 13.
136. Complaint and TRO, supra note 87, at 2.
137. John Lynch, Little Rock Apartments Seek up to $589,692 in Damages After City
Closed Complex, ARK. ONLINE (Dec. 12, 2017, 4:30 AM), http://www.arkansasonline.c
om/news/2017/dec/12/apartments-seek-up-to-589-692-in-damage/.
138. Bachelder et al., supra note 57, at 1–2.
139. Ginny Monk, Study Links Sick Arkansas Tenants to Run-down Apartments, ARK.
ONLINE (Jul. 8, 2018, 4:30 AM), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2018/jul/08/studylinks-sick-tenants-to-run-down-ap/.
140. Bachelder et al., supra note 57, at 1.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 3–4.
143. See, e.g., Suanne Iwarsson, A Long-term Perspective on Person-environment Fit and
ADL Dependence Among Older Swedish Adults, 45 GERONTOLOGIST 327, 355 (June 1, 2005);
Hans-Werner Wahl et. al, The Home Environment and Disability-related Outcomes in Aging
Individuals: What is the Empirical Evidence? 49 GERONTOLOGIST 355, 355 (June 1, 2009).
144. Cynthia Bearer, Environmental Health Hazards: How Children Are Different from
Adults, 103 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP., at 10 (Sept. 1995).
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market by an increase of 29% since 2009.145 Although younger renters are
more likely to recover from illnesses from their environment, they are more
likely to rent than previous generations.146 Perhaps more significantly,
millennials—Americans born between 1981 and 1997147—have overtaken
baby boomers—Americans born between 1946 and 1964148—as the largest
living generation.149 As the number of population segments who are renters
increases, this exposes more people to the harmful effects associated with
substandard housing.
Because housing codes, where they exist, establish minimum standards
generally requiring the prevention of hazards and threats to human safety,
enforcing them through a private right of action available to tenants would
provide basic protections for people living in or considering moving to
Arkansas. However, implementing standardized minimums for ensuring the
protection of human life under residential lease contracts would offer
uniformity for courts, landlords, tenants, and enforcement mechanisms, such
as municipal inspectors or law enforcement. Such standards would also
establish uniformity for property owners statewide.
2.

Comparison with Other States

Arkansas’s implementation of only the tenant responsibility portions of
the URLTA, which includes landlord obligations, tenant obligations, and
remedies along with limitations and landlord liability,150 fell far short of the
Act’s intent of balancing the interests of landlords and tenants. Arkansas is
the only state that has not implemented any obligation to maintain minimum
standards on landlords.151 As has been discussed at length, every other state
in the union has implemented some form of protections for tenants, and
some have not implemented protections for landlords.152 Despite strong
145. Bob Sullivan, Renting is Overtaking the Housing Market. Here’s Why, USA TODAY
(Nov. 11, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/realestate/2017/11/11/renting-homes-overtaking-housing-market-heres-why/845474001/.
146. Millennials Are Driving Up the Single-Family Rental Market--Here’s Why, FORBES
(Oct.
17,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesrealestatecouncil/2017/10/17/
millennials-are-driving-up-the-single-family-rental-market-heres-why/#15fefff4d2a8.
147. Richard Fry, Millennials Overtake Baby Boomers as America’s Largest Generation,
PEW RES. (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/25/millennialsovertake-baby-boomers/.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Lawrence R. McDonough, Then and Now: The Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act and the Revised Residential Landlord and Tenant Act-Still Bold and Relevant?,
35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 975, 978 (2013).
151. See supra notes 1, 2, 6, 13, 31, 35, 48, 51, 57, 59, 87, 131, 132, 133, 137, & 139.
152. Id.
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support from Arkansas landlords153 and broad consensus on the need for
tenant protections,154 Arkansas stands alone as the only state without any
protections for tenants but strong protections for landlords.
B.

Economic Implications of Implementing an Implied Warranty of
Habitability in Arkansas

On a small scale, becoming a landlord may occur by circumstance, as
with an inheritance,155 marriage,156 or divorce,157 or it can occur intentionally
through purchasing an investment property or buying a new property and
retaining the previous property to lease.158 On a larger scale, an investor or
group of investors may purchase a number of single or multifamily housing
units and make a business out of providing housing to lessees.159 Absentee
ownership has been linked to a decrease in property value, increased crime,
and substantial investment to revitalize historic neighborhoods.160 In all
cases, the leased properties are investments to the owner or owners and
homes to the lessees. Because of the costs associated with not protecting
their investments, landlords should welcome minimum standards as guides
for long-term value increases of their properties.161 Furthermore, because
landlords can only recover monthly expenses or see profit returns when
properties are leased and generating revenue, occupancy rates are of critical
importance.162 Because of the costs associated with decreased occupancy
rates, it is in landlords’ best interests to maximize occupancy rates over the
153. LANDLORDS ASS’N OF ARK., LEGIS. COMMITTEE, http://www.arkansaslandlords.
org/legislative-committee (last visited Dec. 29, 2018) (“[T]he LAA is an organization of
roughly 1,000 ‘mom and pop’ landlords, with memberships in chapters across the state [,
which] support[s] . . . a Habitability Bill with minimum standard requirements that is fair to
both landlords and tenants.”).
154. The Commission, supra note 2.
155. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-201, et seq. (West, Westlaw through 2018).
156. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-101, et seq. (West, Westlaw through 2018).
157. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-315. (West, Westlaw through 2018).
158. Laura Agadoni, 7 Things to Know Before Becoming a Landlord, TRULIA: BLOG (Jul.
19, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://www.trulia.com/blog/think-can-landlord-7-things-consider/.
159. Marty Cook, Oklahoma Investor Buys Mountain View Apartments in Fayetteville
(NWA Real Deals), ARK. BUS. (Oct. 26, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.arkansasbusiness.
com/article/107781/oklahoma-investor-buys-mountain-view-apartments-in-fayetteville.
160. Community Development Group Transforms Arkansas Town, FED. RES. BANK OF ST.
LOUIS (2000), https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/bridges/fall-2000/community-develop
ment -group-transforms-arkansas-town.
161. Luke Jones, Sin City: How Apartment Managers Can Avoid Crime, Despair, ARK.
BUS. (Nov. 12, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.arkansasbusiness.com/article/88596/apartmentmanagers-face-crime-disrepair.
162. 2016 NAA Survey of Operating Expense Income & Expenses in Rental Apartment
Communities, NAT’L APARTMENT ASS’N (Aug. 2016), https://www.naahq.org/newspublications/units/august-2016/article/2016-naa-survey-operating-income-expenses-rental.
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long term.163 In the short term, occupancy results in reliable income, which
can be used to cover expenses, including maintenance. Maintaining
properties helps to retain and increase property value, which delivers an
even greater return on investment for the landlord through refinancing or
selling the property.
1.

Dispelling the Myth of Increased Rental Prices

“Lemon tenants,” or those who commit waste on leased properties, are
major sources of risk for landlords.164 It is these tenants and landlords’
corresponding desire to protect their investments that have brought about
protections in the law for landlords to mitigate potential damages caused by
tenants.165 In addition to this risk to landlords, limited evidence supports the
notion that enforcing a quality standard in housing, under specific
circumstances, could increase the cost to landlords, which would be passed
on to tenants.166 However, a quantitative study of existing literature on the
subject of the effects of housing codes on housing costs found that while a
positive correlation exists, it is limited to less than 5% and the majority of
cost increases come from building codes and zoning requirements.167
Considering Arkansas’s median gross rent price of $689 in 2016,168 even the
maximum 5% increase would only increase rent by less than $35.169
2.

Economic Benefits to Landlords

Short term costs for not repairing minor problems such as water
intrusion and electrical malfunctions can be catastrophic to landlords,
averaging $4,700 nationwide for water damage repair and mold remediation
and $10,500 to repair smoke and fire damage after a small electrical fire.170
163. Id.
164. John D. Benjamin, Kenneth M. Lusht, & James D. Shilling, What Do Rental
Contracts Reveal About Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Rental Housing Markets? 26
REAL EST. ECON. 309, 309 (1998).
165. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-110 (West, Westlaw through 2018).
166. Corbett A. Grainger, The Distributional Effects of Pollution Regulations: Do Renters
Fully Pay for Cleaner Air? 96 J. PUB. ECON. 840, 840 (2012).
167. David Listokin & David Hattis, Building Codes and Housing, 8 CITYSCAPE 1, 21
(2005), https://www.huduser.gov/periodicals/cityscpe/vol8num1/ch2.pdf.
168. Quick Facts: Arkansas, supra note 128.
169. 689 * (.05) = 34.45.
170. How Much Does it Cost to Repair & Cleanup Water Damage?, HOME ADVISOR
(2007), https://www.homeadvisor.com/cost/disaster-recovery/repair-water-damage/; How
Much Does it Cost to Remove Mold and Toxic Materials?, HOME ADVISOR (2017),
https://www.homeadvisor.com/cost/environmental-safety/remove-mold-and-toxic-materials/;
How Much Does it Cost to Repair Fire & Smoke Damage?, HOME ADVISOR (2017),
https://www.homeadvisor.com/cost/disaster-recovery/repair-fire-and-smoke-damage/.
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However, the costs of substantively correcting small problems immediately
can prevent those drastic expenses in the long term and even increase the
value of the property, preventing as much as a 10% reduction in value on
appraisal.171 A study jointly conducted by the University of Connecticut
School of Business and Syracuse University’s Department of Economics
suggests “maintenance adds roughly 1% per year to the value of the
home.”172 Investments in improvements, such as kitchen, bath, and
infrastructure upgrades, can more than offset the cost of investment in these
areas by increasing the resale value of the property.173 The value return is
often immediate.174 However, rental property investment returns are most
commonly realized in the long-term.175 Therefore, it is in the inherent
interest of landlords to ensure rental properties have no defects that could
interrupt or deter occupancy rates. If all landlords were subject to the same
minimum standards, true market competition would exist between them and
promote a positive correlation between property desirability and occupancy.
3.

Economic Benefits to Tenants

Tenants would also benefit from this structure through reduced
expenditures on repairs undertaken on their own behalf, some of which may
not meet landlord expectations and diminish property value. Tenants would
benefit from fewer interruptions to their lives, including health related issues
and missed work.176 Decreased productivity increases employee turnover,
which burdens Arkansas businesses by imposing higher training and
opportunity costs.177 Simply put, time and money spent on medical treatment
for preventable illnesses associated with poorly maintained housing are time
and money taken away from the Arkansas economy.178 These expenses

171. John Riha, How Much Does Regular Maintenance Add to Your Home?, NAT’L
ASS’N REALTORS: HOUSE LOGIC (2017), https://www.houselogic.com/organize-maintain/
home-maintenance-tips/value-home-maintenance/.
172. John P. Harding, Stuart S. Rosenthal, & C. F. Sirmans, Depreciation of Housing,
Capital, Maintenance, and House Price Inflation: Estimates from a Repeat Sales Model
(June 30, 2006), at 4, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.571.5618
&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
173. Judy Dutton, The Renovations That Will Pay Off the Most for Your Home in 2017,
REALTOR.COM (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.realtor.com/news/trends/best-and-worstrenovations -to-make-in-2017/.
174. Id.
175. John Larson, Top Reasons Why Real Estate Investing is so Popular, FORBES (Oct.
30, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesrealestatecouncil/2017/10/30/top-reasonswhy-real-estate-investing-is-so-popular/#21cfcaa17c53.
176. See Dube et al., supra note 9, at 2.
177. Id. at 2.
178. Id.; Jacobs et al., supra note 8, at 603.
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contribute to the need for expansion in healthcare subsidization and
decreased productivity for businesses.
4.

Benefits to the Arkansas Economy

These economic factors combine to the detriment of Arkansas and its
communities. Businesses currently in Arkansas may find their growth
restrained179 and those interested in relocating might never consider it as an
option because of its treatment of its residents.180 Issues such as the absence
of implied warranty of habitability contribute to the negative stigma
Arkansas has long fought to overcome181 and add doubt in the minds of
companies who might otherwise plant seeds of investment in its fertile
ground.182
Economics research by the National Bureau of Economic Research has
shown that improved “health has a positive and statistically significant
effect on economic growth.”183 The research suggests that improving a
person’s life expectancy by one year contributes to a 4% increase in
output.184 This means a mere one-year increase in the life expectancy of the
one million Arkansans who lease their residences could unlock $1.65
billion.185 If the study’s results carry beyond the initial year, the
compounding impact on Arkansas’s economy could be enormous.

179. Jim Carlton, Housing Crunch Threatens Reno’s Tech Boom, FOX BUS. (Apr. 20,
2017),
http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2017/04/20/housing-crunch-threatens-renostech-boom.html (The article points to a lack of adequate housing as a restraint on growth
potential, but the principle that disruption in housing prevents worker availability and
consequently prevents smooth business operation and growth holds true in both contexts.).
180. Dan Schulman, PayPal Withdraws Plan for Charlotte Expansion, PAYPAL (Apr. 5,
2016), https://www.paypal.com/stories/us/paypal-withdraws-plan-for-charlotte-expansion.
181. C. Fred Williams, Arkansas’s Image, ENCYCLOPEDIA ARK. HIST. & CULTURE (May
5, 2017), http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?entryID=1.
182. Nathan Layne, Wal-Mart Support of Gay Rights Turns on Business, REUTERS (Apr.
2, 2015, 6:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-walmart-arkansas-analysis/wal-martsupport-of-gay-rights-turns-on-business-idUSKBN0MT13E20150402.
183. David E. Bloom, David Canning, & Jaypee Sevilla, The Effect of Health on
Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. 5 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8587, 2001), available at http://www.nber.
org/papers/w8587.pdf.
184. Id.
185. Regional Facts: Arkansas, U.S. BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS (Sept. 26, 2017),
https://bea.gov/regional/bearfacts/pdf.cfm?fips=05000&areatype=STATE&geotype=3 (The
U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis reported Arkansas’s gross
domestic product for 2016 as $121.4 billion. Because renters comprise approximately 34% of
Arkansas’s population, increasing their productivity by 4% would contribute to an overall
gross domestic product increase of $1.65 billion.).
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Considering corporate reactions186 to more divisive social issues, such
as transgender bathrooms and laws denying discrimination protection on the
basis of sexual orientation,187 the economic downsides in the form of lost
opportunity costs188 and businesses overlooking Arkansas are potentially
staggering.189 For example, the opportunity cost North Carolina lost during
its highly publicized transgender bathroom debate190 included an initial
investment of between $77 million and $201 million, $42 million annually
in salaries, and 650 jobs.191 Although such specific examples are not readily
available for Arkansas, its tourism industry alone attracts $7.2 billion
annually.192 Damage to the Arkansas tourism industry and its associated jobs
may serve as an indicator of other businesses opting to look elsewhere when
making their decision to open a new location or headquarters.193 Those

186. See Schulman, supra note 180.
187. See Jonathan M. Katz & Erik Eckholm, Anti-Gay Laws Bring Backlash in
Mississippi and North Carolina, N.Y TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/04/06/us/gay-rights-mississippi-north-carolina.html;
Garrett
Epps,
Public
Accommodations and Private Discrimination, ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/public-accommodations-and-privatediscrimination/390435/.
188. Tasneem Nashrulla, Here’s Everyone Who Refuses to Work in North Carolina and
Mississippi Over Anti-LGBT Laws, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 20, 2016, 9:37 AM),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/tasneemnashrulla/here-are-the-people-and-companies-that-refuseto-work-in-nor?utm_term=.rfBWn6PNPD#.nf8G3E7O7o.
189. U.S. CONGRESS JOINT ECON. COMMITTEE DEMOCRATIC STAFF, THE ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY
(Nov. 2013), https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/8e0d743a-ec6b-4474-88e77e59e3938cd9/enda---final-11.5.13.pdf.
190. North Carolina Transgender ‘Bathroom Bill’ Flushed by Lawmakers, FOX NEWS
(Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/north-carolina-transgender-bathroombill-flushed-by-lawmakers.
191. Will Doran, North Carolina Economic Official Says HB2 Has Not Harmed the State
Economy, POLITIFACT (Oct. 28, 2016, 8:40 AM), http://www.politifact.com/northcarolina/statements/2016/oct/28/john-skvarla/top-north-carolina-economic-official-says-hb2has-/.
192. Wesley Brown, Arkansas Tourism Industry Hopes to Build Off Two-Year ‘Hot
Streak,’ May Face Some Economic Headwinds in 2017, TALK BUS. & POL. (Jan. 23, 2017,
11:37 AM), https://talkbusiness.net/2017/01/arkansas-tourism-industry-hopes-to-build-offtwo-year-hot-streak-may-face-some-economic-headwinds-in-2017/.
193. Jill Disis, The Controversy That Could Hold Back Some Amazon HQ2 Contenders,
CNN MONEY (Nov. 7, 2017, 1:03 PM), http://money. cnn.com/2017 /11/07/technology/
business/amazon-hq2-state-laws/index.html; Rick Morgan, Atlanta bid for Amazon HQ2 gets
new political problem: Georgia Adoption Bill, CNBC (Feb. 23, 2018, 5:22 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/23/atlanta-bid-for-amazon-hq2-didnt-need-georgia-anti-lgbtadoption-bill.html.
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social concerns may be mere indicators of a looming change in corporate
thinking from short-term gains to long-term impact.194
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite Arkansas’s entrepreneurial spirit that surely carries forward
from its origins on America’s frontier, the State carries reputational baggage
that weighs heavily in the minds of companies that might otherwise consider
Arkansas in their expansion plans.195 This baggage, one form of which is the
unwillingness to adopt even the most basic of protections for renters, weighs
on the minds of employers who increasingly consider employee happiness
as part of their business calculus. Arkansas will likely never even cross these
employers’ minds as they look to better reputations and more inviting places
from which to conduct their business.
This is an easy fix. Arkansas should follow the longstanding trend
among every other state by enacting statutes that make basic moral,
religious, and economic sense by ending the archaic tradition of forcing
tenants to improve and maintain landlords’ property investments. In the
near-term, Arkansas courts should adopt the approach taken by the
Alexander court and uphold existing laws, regulations, and ordinances.
Arkansas appellate courts should recognize this approach and apply it
statewide as a private right of action under contract theory.
Enforcing housing codes and enabling private rights of action for
tenants encourages landlords to maintain their investments for their own
economic gain and for the betterment of tenants. Landlords will suffer from
fewer interruptions to their leases, enjoy increased and sustained occupancy
rates, and enjoy increases in property values as the overall market increases
194. BlackRock CEO to Companies: Pay Attention to Societal Impact, FOX BUS. (Jan. 17,
2018), http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/blackrock-ceo-to-companies-pay-attention-tosocietal-impact.
195. See, e.g., Disis, supra note 193; Doran, supra note 191; Hayley Miller, HRC
Announces 60 Companies Launch Business Coalition for the Equality Act, HUM. RTS.
CAMPAIGN (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.hrc.org/press/hrc-announces-60-companies-launchbusiness-coalition-for-the-equality-act.
* J.D., UA Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law, anticipated 2020; M.P.S., Clinton
School of Public Service, anticipated 2020; M.A., University of Oklahoma, 2011; B.A.,
University of Arkansas, 2006. I am grateful for the guidance of my professors and mentors
throughout the writing and editing process, especially Professors Lynn Foster and Peter
Alexander. My wife, Hannah, and daughter, Evelyn, are owed the greatest credit for any of
my successes; with their constant love and support anything is possible. Finally, I dedicate
this note to the memory of my sister, Lorraine, whose commitment to justice, fairness, and
defense of the least among us inspired me to pursue a legal career.

140

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

in value. Beyond the economic benefit to landlords, the state and its
businesses will benefit from more stable employees, who will suffer from
fewer distractions of threats to their health and safety in their rented
residences. Balancing the interests of all parties will unlock untapped
potential in the Arkansas residential lease market and make Arkansas a more
appealing choice for businesses interested in expanding operations.
Wesley N. Manus*

EMPLOYMENT LAW—THE SPLIT OVER THE SHIFT: THE BURDEN OF
PROVING CAUSATION IN CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY UNDER
ERISA
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) to govern the administration of employee benefit plans1 and to
protect plan participants and their beneficiaries.2 Prior to ERISA’s enactment,
the law governing employee benefit plans did not adequately protect the
interests of the benefitting employees.3 ERISA addresses this shortcoming by
imposing specific duties on the fiduciaries4 responsible for administering
plans, and lists certain acts that constitute a breach of those duties.5 ERISA
also provides beneficiaries with a remedy in the event such a breach occurs.6
However, beneficiary protection under ERISA is not absolute. ERISA,
although enacted to protect program participants, was also created to promote
public interest by encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans.7
Congress determined that if ERISA placed burdens on employers that were
so great as to increase “administrative costs, or litigation expenses, [it would]
unduly discourage employers from offering [ERISA] plans in the first place.”8
A fiduciary’s liability for breaching a duty to a beneficiary under ERISA
is governed by Section 409 of ERISA (“§ 1109”).9 This statute provides that
1. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (finding that “Congress enacted
ERISA to ‘protect . . . the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries’ by setting out substantive regulatory requirements for employee benefit plans
and to ‘provid[e] for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.’”).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2016); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 20–26; Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497
(1996) (finding that the common law of trusts was inadequate to protect ERISA beneficiaries).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2016) (defining fiduciary as one who (1) exercises any
discretionary authority or control over a plan or its assets, (2) renders investment advice for a
fee with respect to any asset of the plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (3)
“has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such
plan.”).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2016) (listing fiduciary duties).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2016).
7. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (“In sum, the detailed
provisions of § 502(a) [of ERISA at 29 U.S.C.S. § 1132(a)] set forth a comprehensive civil
enforcement scheme that represents a careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims
settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation of employee
benefit plans.”).
8. Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 517 (2010).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2016).
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when the fiduciary breaches a duty imposed on him by ERISA, he will be
required to reimburse the employee benefit plan for any losses his breach of
fiduciary duty caused the plan to incur.10 The plain language of this statute
limits liability to instances where (1) the allegedly breaching party is a
fiduciary within the definition of ERISA, (2) this fiduciary breaches a duty
ERISA imposes on him, (3) the benefit plan incurs losses, and (4) the
fiduciary’s breach caused those losses to the plan.11
Courts disagree on the number of barriers ERISA imposes on
beneficiaries bringing claims for breach of fiduciary duty.12 After a plan
beneficiary demonstrates the first two elements, does the plaintiff have to
prove that the breach was the cause of the plan’s loss, or does a presumption
exist that shifts the burden to the plan fiduciary to disprove any such
causation?13
This note addresses the circuit split introduced above, and argues that
after an employee benefit plan participant has proven (1) a plan fiduciary
breached a fiduciary duty established by ERISA and (2) the plan has incurred
losses, it is inappropriate for a court to assume there is a causal connection
between the breach and the incurrence of plan losses that would shift the
burden to the fiduciary to disprove any such connection.
Part II of this note provides background information on the development
of ERISA and the duties imposed on ERISA fiduciaries that led to this current
two-way circuit split.14 Part III summarizes the circuit split and discusses the
leading case from each side of the split.15 Part IV argues (1) neither the plain
language nor legislative intent of ERISA indicates the burden of proving
causation should shift to the defendant, (2) although the common law of trusts
is instructive in ERISA interpretation, the fundamental differences between
trust law and ERISA weigh against its application to proving causation under
§ 1109(a), and (3) public policy favors leaving the burden of proof with the
plaintiff in an action against an ERISA fiduciary for breach of duty.16
II. BACKGROUND
ERISA is a “comprehensive and reticulated” statutory scheme that
regulates private employee benefit plans and is the product of a decade of

10. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
11. Id.; Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co. Emp. Stock Ownership Plan & Tr. v. Alerus Fin., N.A.,
858 F.3d 1324, 1334 (10th Cir. 2017).
12. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding, 858 F.3d. at 1336.
13. Id.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
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study by Congress.17 Prior to ERISA’s enactment, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) regulated employee benefit plans, and the Department of Labor
played no role.18 The IRS’s primary role in regulating employee benefit plans
was to ensure plans produced revenue, and to ensure those taking advantage
of their use did not use them to evade tax obligations.19 In a series of
legislative enactments, the responsibility for regulating employee benefit
plans transferred from the IRS to the Department of Labor, and plan
participants were slowly given more protection.20 However, even after these
bills passed, the protection was insufficient; in the event of fiduciary
misconduct, plan participants were left to rely on the equitable remedies of
the common law of trusts.21 For example, the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act required fiduciaries to disclose a plan’s contents to the
government and provide plan information to plan participants upon request.22
These requirements lacked standards to govern fiduciary behavior and
essentially left it up to the participant to police his own plan without any
framework by which to hold fiduciaries accountable.23 Congress then passed
the Labor-Management Relations Act, which provided guidelines for the
establishment and operation of pension funds administered jointly by an
employer and a union.24 However, this Act was not intended to establish, nor
did it provide, standards for the preservation of vested benefits, funding
adequacy, security of investment, or fiduciary conduct.25
In response to these legislative inadequacies, Congress enacted ERISA.26
From 1940 to 1973, the number of employees participating in private pension
17. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993); 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2013)
(referring to congressional findings that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee
benefit plans in recent years had been rapid and substantial, and thus the need for a
comprehensive regulatory scheme was greater than ever).
18. History of EBSA and ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.
gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/history-of-ebsa-and-erisa (last visited Oct. 20, 2018)
(“The Revenue Acts of 1921 and 1926 allowed employers to deduct pension contributions from
corporate income, and allowed for the income of the pension fund’s portfolio to accumulate
tax free. The participant in the plan realized no income until monies were distributed to the
participant, provided the plan was tax qualified. To qualify for such favorable tax treatment,
the plans had to meet certain minimum employee coverage and employer contribution
requirements. The Revenue Act of 1942 provided stricter participation requirements and, for
the first time, disclosure requirements.”).
19. S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4841.
20. Id. at 4840–42.
21. Id. at 4840–41.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4840–41.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2016); H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 3–5, 11–13 (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4641.
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plans grew from four million to over thirty million.27 As a result of this
growth, Congress determined that the enactment of ERISA as a uniform
regulatory scheme was necessary to protect the well-being and security of
these employees and their dependents, and also to protect the stability of
employment and development of industrial relations.28 Specifically, Congress
sought to protect the following four plan interests:29 (1) vesting,30 (2)
funding,31 (3) reinsurance,32 and (4) portability.33
Congress sought to bring efficiency and predictability to employee
benefit plans, and, despite the immense level of protection ERISA gives to
plan participants, Congress did not completely ignore the interests of the
employers administering these benefit plans.34 “ERISA represents a ‘careful
balancing’ between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a
plan” and encouraging the creation of plans.35 Congress sought “to create a
system that is [not] so complex that administrative costs, or litigation
expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering [ERISA] plans in the
first place.”36 ERISA encourages the creation of employee benefit plans by
assuring employers a “predictable set of liabilities under uniform standards”
of conduct and a uniform system of remedies for beneficiaries when a
violation of those standards occurs.37
In addition to reinforcing previously enacted plan disclosure
requirements, ERISA sets out the standard of conduct a plan fiduciary must
abide by in his administration of the benefit plan.38 Violation of any of the
duties imposed by ERISA may result in civil liability if the plan beneficiary
brings suit against the fiduciary for perceived misconduct.39
Once a court determines that, under ERISA, a given defendant qualifies
as a fiduciary40 and is thus subject to liability, the court must decide whether
he has breached a duty imposed on him.41 These duties are derived from the
27. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 3–5, 11–13 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4641.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1001; Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004).
29. S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4841.
30. Id. (providing assurance that benefits would be available upon retirement).
31. Id. (correcting the lack of requirement prior to ERISA to fund past service liabilities).
32. Id. (providing an insurance program to protect plan assets from the sponsoring
employer terminating the plan or going out of business).
33. Id. (giving the employee the ability to bring his benefit plan with him when switching
jobs).
34. See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2470 (2014).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4841.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2016).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2016).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2016).
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common law of trusts.42 ERISA requires that a fiduciary discharge his duties
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the plan participants and with
“the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character with like
aims.”43 Additionally, a fiduciary must: (1) discharge his duties for the
exclusive purpose of “providing benefits and paying plan expenses,”44 (2)
diversify the plan’s investments,45 (3) follow the terms of plan documents to
the extent the plan terms are consistent with ERISA,46 (4) avoid conflicts of
interest,47 and (5) not engage in those prohibited transactions listed in §
1106.48 “Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches
any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed [on him by ERISA],
shall be personally liable” to the plan for any losses that result from such a
breach. 49
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT
A two-way circuit split currently exists regarding whether the burden of
proving causation should or should not shift to the defendant fiduciary after
the plaintiff shows that the benefit plan incurred a loss and the fiduciary
engaged in wrongful conduct.50 The Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits favor
shifting the burden,51 while the Second, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have chosen to leave the burden with the plaintiff.52

42. Cent. States Pension Fund v. Centr. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
44. Retirement Plans, Benefits & Savings, Fiduciary Responsibilities, U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/retirement/fiduciaryresp (last visited Oct. 20,
2018).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
47. Retirement Plans, supra note 44.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (2016) (enumerating certain prohibited transactions, such as selfdealing or engaging in other transactions that may implicate a conflict of interest).
49. 29 U.S.C. §1109(a) (2016).
50. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co. Emp. Stock Ownership Plan & Tr. v. Alerus Fin., N.A., 858
F.3d 1324, 1333 (10th Cir. 2017).
51. See Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 362 (4th Cir. 2014); McDonald
v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1995); Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d
660, 671 (8th Cir. 1992).
52. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding, 858 F.3d at 1337; Silverman v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 138
F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 1998) (Jacobs, J. and Meskill, J., concurring); see also Wright v. Ore.
Metallurgical Corp., 360 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447,
1459–60 (6th Cir. 1995) abrogated on other grounds by Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer,
134 S. Ct. 2459 (2014); Willett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 953 F.2d 1335, 1343–44
(11th Cir. 1992).
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Of the courts that shift the burden, the only court to acknowledge the
circuit split itself and make an argument in favor of the shift was the Fourth
Circuit in 2014 in Tatum v. RJR Pension Investment Committee.53 In Tatum,
an employee who participated in his employer’s benefit plan brought a suit
for breach of fiduciary duty alleging the employer liquidated two of the plan’s
funds on an arbitrary timeline without conducting a thorough investigation to
first determine if such a liquidation was a wise investment decision.54 Once
the employee proved both that the benefit plan incurred losses and that his
employer breached his fiduciary duty, the court shifted the burden to the
employer to prove his breach did not cause the loss to the benefit plan.55 The
court reasoned that, although causation is a required element under § 1109(a),
and under the default rule the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff,56 the
exception to the default rule found in the common law of trusts57 should be
applied because it is consistent with ERISA’s goal to protect plan
participants.58 Additionally, the court believed that keeping the burden with
the plaintiff to prove a fiduciary’s breach caused a plan’s loss would create a
significant barrier for those plan beneficiaries seeking relief.59
Tatum’s holding is consistent with several other circuit decisions. The
Fifth Circuit in McDonald v. Provident Indemnity Life Insurance Company
held,
To establish a claimed breach of fiduciary duty, an ERISA plaintiff must
prove a breach of a fiduciary duty and a prima facie case of loss to the
plan. “Once the plaintiff has satisfied these burdens, ‘the burden of
persuasion shifts to the fiduciary to prove that the loss was not caused by
. . . the breach of duty.’”60

Prior to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in McDonald, the Eighth Circuit in
Martin v. Feilen held,
“[O]nce the ERISA plaintiff has proved a breach of fiduciary duty and a
prima facie case of loss to the plan . . . the burden of persuasion shifts to

53. 761 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 2014).
54. Id. at 350.
55. Id. at 363.
56. Id. at 361.
57. Id. at 362; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 100 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2012)
(providing an exception to the default rule that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving his
claim by stating that “in matters of causation . . . when a beneficiary has succeeded in proving
that the trustee has committed a breach of trust and that a related loss has occurred, the burden
shifts to the trustee to prove that the loss would have occurred in the absence of the breach.”).
58. Tatum, 761 F.3d at 363.
59. Id.
60. 60 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1995).
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the fiduciary to prove that the loss was not caused by . . . the breach of
duty.”61

However, most federal circuit courts evaluating the issue agree the
burden of proving that a fiduciary’s breach caused losses to a plan lies with
the plaintiff, and no exceptions apply.62 The Tenth Circuit in Pioneer Centres
Holding Co. v. Alerus Financial held, “[T]he burden falls squarely on the
plaintiff asserting a breach of fiduciary duty claim under § 1109(a) of ERISA
to prove losses to the plan ‘resulting from’ the alleged breach of fiduciary
duty.”63
In the Pioneer case, Pioneer Centres Holding Company (“Pioneer”)
hired Alerus Financial (“Alerus”) as an independent “transactional trustee” to
oversee the creation of an Employee Stock Ownership Program (“ESOP”), a
type of employee benefit plan governed by ERISA.64 Alerus’s job was to
determine the terms on which the ESOP would purchase shares of stock from
one of the present owners of Pioneer.65 Pioneer owned multiple car
dealerships, one of which was a Land Rover dealership.66 Pioneer’s agreement
with Land Rover provided that Pioneer could not change its ownership
without first receiving Land Rover’s consent and, in order to move forward
with selling his stock to the ESOP, the present owner of Pioneer had to receive
this consent.67 Even after it became apparent this consent would never be
given, Pioneer attempted to move forward and requested Alerus’s signature
on certain transaction documents.68 Alerus, not approving of the terms in the
documents, refused to sign them and advised Pioneer to abandon the proposed
deal.69
Much later, after the deal had been abandoned, the participants of the
Pioneer ESOP (the “Plan Participants”) brought suit against Alerus, on behalf
of the benefit plan, because the stock purchase had never gone through.70
These Plan Participants alleged Alerus’s failure to sign the transaction
documents caused the deal to fail. Alerus countered that because Land Rover
61. Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 671 (8th Cir. 1992).
62. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co. Emp. Stock Ownership Plan & Tr. v. Alerus Fin., N.A., 858
F.3d 1324, 1337 (10th Cir. 2017); Silverman v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 138 F.3d 98, 105
(2d Cir. 1998) (Jacobs, J. and Meskill, J., concurring); see also Wright v. Ore. Metallurgical
Corp., 360 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1459–60 (6th
Cir. 1995) abrogated on other grounds by Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct.
2459 (2014).
63. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding, 858 F.3d at 1337.
64. Id. at 1327.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1330.
69. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding., 858 F.3d at 1330.
70. Id. at 1331.
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was never going to consent to the deal anyway, Alerus’s failure did not cause
the loss to the plan.71 The court held that the Plan Participants, as the plaintiffs,
had to prove Alerus’s failure to sign the transaction documents caused the
plan’s losses, despite the Plan Participants’ argument that the court should
adopt the common law of trusts’ burden shifting approach.72
In coming to the conclusion that the burden of proving causation should
not shift to Alerus, the court relied primarily on the statutory language of §
1109(a).73 The court held that when the plain language of the statute expressly
limits the fiduciary’s liability to losses that “result from” a breach, there is
little reason to require the plaintiff to prove only that the loss was “related to”
the fiduciary’s breach.74 As a result, the court saw “no reason to depart from
the ‘ordinary default rule that plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to prove their
claims.’”75 In response to the argument that the common law of trusts should
apply, the court briefly reasoned, “[The] law of trusts often will inform, but
will not necessarily determine the outcome of, an effort to interpret ERISA’s
fiduciary duties.”76
IV. ARGUMENT
Courts that follow a burden shifting approach to claims for breach of
fiduciary duty justify such an approach based on (1) its use in the common
law of trusts, (2) fairness and public policy, and (3) the structure and purpose
of ERISA.77 The following analysis addresses each of these rationales for
shifting the burden of proof and argues (a) the plain language of the statute
does not support shifting the burden;78 (b) ERISA does not have to be
interpreted to provide as much protection as the common law of trusts
provides;79 (c) the common law of trusts should not apply to this situation;80
and (d) public policy—as well as the purpose of ERISA—would be better
served by leaving the burden of proving causation with the plaintiff.81
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1337.
73. Id. at 1334.
74. Id.
75. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co., 858 F.3d at 1334 (quoting Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v.
Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005)).
76. Id. (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996)).
77. Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 362 (4th Cir. 2014); New York
State Teamsters Council Health & Hosp. Fund v. Estate of DePerno, 18 F.3d 179, 182 (2d Cir.
1994); Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 671 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing trust law as support for its
decision to shift the burden to the fiduciary).
78. See infra Subsection A.
79. See infra Subsection B(1).
80. See Infra Subsection B(2).
81. See infra Subsection C.
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The Plain Language of 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) Makes a Causal
Connection Between Loss and Breach of Duty a Necessary Element of
a Plaintiff’s Claim

The plain language of 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) does not support shifting the
burden of proving causation to the fiduciary. The first step in determining
whether Congress intended the beneficiary or the fiduciary to carry the burden
of proving causation in claims under ERISA for breach of fiduciary duty is to
look at the plain language of the statute.82 A fiduciary’s liability for breaching
statutory duties as laid out in 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) provides, “[A] fiduciary . .
. who breaches any . . . duties imposed upon fiduciaries . . . shall be personally
liable . . . [for] any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach.”83 The
plain language dictates that the fiduciary is only liable for a plan’s losses if
those losses were caused by the fiduciary’s breach of duty. Courts on both
sides of the circuit split have agreed that as a result of this language, “there
must be a showing of some causal link between the alleged breach and the
loss [the] plaintiff seeks to recover” before liability will be imposed on the
fiduciary.84
While both sides of the circuit split recognize causation as a necessary
element of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, courts disagree over which
party bears the burden of proving or disproving that element.85 When a statute
is silent on burden allocation, as it is here, the default rule is the plaintiff bears
the burden of proving his claim because he is “the one who wishes to change
the current state of affairs.”86 In determining which party should bear the
82. Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009) (“As with any question of statutory
interpretation, our analysis begins with the plain language of the statute.”).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2016) (“Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan
who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by
this title shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting
from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have
been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other
equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such
fiduciary.”).
84. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co. Emp. Stock Ownership Plan & Tr. v. Alerus Fin., N.A., 858
F.3d 1324, 1334 (10th Cir. 2017); Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 361 (4th
Cir. 2014); Plasterers’ Local Union No. 96 Pension Plan v. Pepper, 663 F.3d 210, 217 (4th Cir.
2011) (finding a breach of fiduciary duty “does not automatically equate to causation of loss
and therefore liability,” and consequently, a “fiduciary can only be held liable upon a finding
that the breach actually caused a loss to the plan.”); Willett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Ala., 953 F.2d 1335, 1343–44 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Section 409 of ERISA establishes that an
action exists to recover losses that ‘resulted’ from the breach of a fiduciary duty; thus, the
statute does require that the breach of the fiduciary duty be the proximate cause of the losses
claimed.”).
85. See Pioneer Ctrs. Holding, 858 F.3d at 1334. But see Tatum, 761 F.3d at 362 (2014).
86. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding, 858 F.3d at 1335 (“This is because the ‘burdens of pleading
and proof with regard to most facts have been and should be assigned to the plaintiff who
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burden of proving causation, the court should follow this default rule and
place the burden on the plaintiff. There are exceptions to this default rule, and
the burden of proving that one of these exceptions applies falls on the party
seeking to benefit from its application.87 These exceptions include (1) when
one of the elements of the claim qualifies as an affirmative defense,88 (2) when
there is a congressional intent to place the burden on the defendant, or (3)
when there is an exception rooted in the substantive body of law, such as the
one present in the common law of trusts.89
In § 1109(a), there is no evidence that “lack of causation” is an
affirmative defense that a defendant who has breached his fiduciary duty must
prove to avoid liability; causation is an element of the claim, not an
affirmative defense.90 “Whether something constitutes an element, as opposed
to an affirmative defense or exception, turns on whether one can omit the
exception from the statute without doing violence to the definition of the
offense.”91 Here, if one were to remove the requirement that losses to the plan
must result from a fiduciary’s breach before a plan can recover those losses
from a breaching fiduciary, the definition of the “offense” would change
generally seeks to change the present state of affairs and who therefore naturally should be
expected to bear the risk of failure of proof or persuasion.’”); Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast,
546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005) (“[W]e have usually assumed without comment that plaintiffs bear the
burden of persuasion regarding the essential aspects of their claims.”); Gross v. FBL Fin.
Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 168 (2009) (“When the statute is silent as to who bears the burden of
proving a resulting loss, the ‘ordinary default rule [is] that plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to
prove their claims.’”); Tatum, 761 F.3d at 362 (“Generally, of course, when a statute is silent,
the default rule provides that the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff.”); KENNETH S. BROUN
ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337 (7th ed. 2013).
87. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding, 858 F.3d at 1335; Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 57 (“There are
exceptions to the default rule, such as when ‘certain elements of a plaintiff’s claim . . . can
fairly be characterized as affirmative defenses or exemptions.’”); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334
U.S. 37, 44–45 (1948) (“[T]he burden of proving justification or exemption under a special
exception to the prohibitions of a statute generally rests on one who claims its benefits.”).
88. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding, 858 F.3d at 1335; Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 57 (“There are
exceptions to the default rule, such as when ‘certain elements of a plaintiff’s claim . . . can
fairly be characterized as affirmative defenses or exemptions.’”).
89. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding, 858 F.3d at 1335; Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 57 (“The Supreme
Court cautioned, however, that ‘while the normal default rule does not solve all cases, it
certainly solves most of them . . . [a]bsent some reason to believe that Congress intended
otherwise . . . the burden of persuasion lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking
relief.”).
90. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding, 858 F.3d at 1336 (“To begin, there is nothing in the language
of § 1109(a) or in its legislative history that indicates a Congressional intent to shift the burden
to the fiduciary to disprove causation. Nor is there anything that suggests Congress intended to
make the lack of causation an affirmative defense or an exemption to liability. Whether
something constitutes an element, as opposed to an affirmative defense or exception, turns on
whether “one can omit the exception from the statute without doing violence to the definition
of the offense.”).
91. Id., quoting United States v. Prentiss, 256 F.3d 971, 979 (10th Cir. 2001).
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substantially;92 it would allow plan participants to recover any loss suffered
by a plan from a defendant who has breached his fiduciary duty, regardless of
whether that fiduciary’s breach actually caused the loss. For example, if the
economy dropped into a recession, and this economic downturn caused losses
to the plan, these losses would not have been caused by any breach of duty. If
that fiduciary later, unrelated to the economic downturn, breached a duty to
the plan, he could be held liable for all losses to the plan, even losses that
occurred through no fault of his own.
If plaintiffs were not required to prove causation when bringing a claim
under § 1109(a), there would be broad sweeping liability that would
discourage solvent companies from managing and sponsoring ERISA plans.93
In light of the plain language of § 1109(a), causation cannot “fairly be
characterized as [an] affirmative defense or exemption;” causation is an
express element of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.94
Additionally, there is nothing in the statute or its legislative history to
indicate a congressional intent to shift the burden to the fiduciary to disprove
causation. Congress, having researched employee benefit plans extensively,
and having drafted such a “comprehensive and reticulated statute,”95 could
have very easily put a provision into ERISA showing an intent for the burden
to shift from the plaintiff to the defendant in an action for breach of fiduciary
duty if it had desired to depart from the default rule. Additionally, the
“assumption of inadvertent omission is rendered especially suspect upon
close consideration of ERISA’s interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent
remedial scheme.”96 In light of the plain language of § 1109(a), and the
absence of any indication to the contrary, courts should follow the default rule
and require the plaintiff in an action for breach of fiduciary duty to prove
92. Id. (finding that the requirement that the losses to the plan have resulted from the
breach cannot be omitted from the statute without substantially changing the definition of the
claim, thereby doing violence to it).
93. Silverman v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 138 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 1998) (Jacobs, J.
and Meskill, J., concurring) (“The causation requirement of § 1109(a) acts as a check on this
broadly sweeping liability, to ensure that solvent companies remain willing to undertake
fiduciary responsibilities with respect to ERISA plans.”).
94. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding, 858 F.3d at 1337 (“Viewing the plain language, causation
cannot “fairly be characterized as [an] affirmative defense or exemption, but is an express
element of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).”).
95. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993) (“ERISA is . . . the product of a
decade of congressional study of the Nation’s private employee benefit system.”); Nachman
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980) (“As a predicate for this
comprehensive and reticulated statute, Congress made detailed findings.”).
96. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146–47 (1985) (“The six carefully
integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted,
however, provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that
it simply forgot to incorporate expressly . . . [where] a statute expressly provides a particular
remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it.”).
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every element of his claim, including the causal connection between the losses
the plan incurred and the fiduciary’s breach of duty.
B.

The Common Law of Trusts’ Burden Shifting Framework Should Not
Be Applied to Claims for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under ERISA

The common law of trusts, although providing an exception to the
default rule that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving his claims, should
not be applied to ERISA interpretation in this instance.97 Trust law provides a
burden shifting approach where once “a beneficiary has succeeded in proving
that the trustee has committed a breach of trust and a related loss has occurred,
the burden shifts to the trustee to prove that the loss would have occurred in
the absence of the breach.”98 The fact that ERISA’s fiduciary duties were
based on a trustee’s duties in the common law of trusts provides much of the
support for the argument that the burden of proof in the ERISA context should
shift to a defendant who has breached his fiduciary duty.99 The Tenth Circuit
in Pioneer Centres Holding Company, while providing an excellent argument
against burden shifting based on the plain language of § 1109,100 failed to
adequately address the opposition’s argument that the common law of trusts
should apply.101
1.

ERISA Does Not Have to Always Provide as Much Protection to
Beneficiaries as the Common Law of Trusts Offers

Those in favor of applying trust law’s burden shifting framework to
ERISA argue that—because one of Congress’s reasons for enacting ERISA
was to rectify the inadequate protection the common law of trusts provided to
employee benefit plans—offering less protection to beneficiaries than
common law offered would be contrary to ERISA’s purpose.102 But the areas
97. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding, 858 F.3d at 1335 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 100 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (“Another exception to the default rule unique to the
fiduciary duty question arises under the common law of trusts. Trust law advocates a burdenshifting paradigm whereby once ‘a beneficiary has succeeded in proving that the trustee has
committed a breach of trust and that a related loss has occurred, the burden shifts to the trustee
to prove that the loss would have occurred in the absence of the breach.’”)).
98. Id.
99. Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 362 (4th Cir. 2014).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 73–75; Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co., 858 F.3d at
1334.
101. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co., 858 F.3d at 1337.
102. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (“We also recognize, however, that
trust law does not tell the entire story. After all, ERISA’s standards and procedural protections
partly reflect a congressional determination that the common law of trusts did not offer
completely satisfactory protection.”).
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in which the common law of trusts was lacking were plan vesting, funding,
disclosure, reinsurance, and portability—areas that Congress specifically
remedied in ERISA.103 Additionally, ERISA’s enactment created muchneeded national uniformity that was not present under the common law of
trusts.104 In these ways, ERISA countered the common law’s lack of
beneficiary protection; there is no indication that the common law of trusts
was thought to be inadequate in any other ways that would require ERISA to
always be interpreted to provide at least as much protection as trust law
provided.
ERISA actually provides less protection than trust law in some areas.105
These include disclosure of changes to plan benefits, the ability of ERISA
fiduciaries to wear “two hats” as settlor and fiduciary,106 the ability of ERISA
fiduciaries to have financial interests that are adverse to beneficiaries,107 and
the allowance of fiduciaries to serve as officers, employees, agents, and other
representatives of a party in interest rather than requiring undivided loyalty as
is required in the common law of trusts.108 Any argument that ERISA should
103. Id.
104. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 3–5, 11–13 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4650 (“Third, even assuming that the law of trusts is applicable, without detailed information
about the plan, access to the courts, and without standards by which a participant can measure
the fiduciary’s conduct he is not equipped to safeguard either his own rights or the plan assets.
Furthermore, a fiduciary standard embodied in Federal legislation is considered desirable
because it will bring a measure of uniformity in an area where decisions under the same set of
facts may differ from state to state.”).
105. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 225 (2000); H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 3–5, 11–
13 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4640.
106. Michael J. Collins, It’s Common, but Is It Right? The Common Law of Trusts in ERISA
Fiduciary Litigation, 16 LAB. LAW. 391, 407 (2001) (“The courts’ reliance on the common law
of trusts in developing a fiduciary duty to disclose serious consideration of benefit changes is
improper. Most importantly, this approach is inconsistent with the statutory text of ERISA. It
also has the effect of turning non-fiduciary ‘settlor’ functions into fiduciary functions and is
inconsistent with ERISA’s ‘written plan document’ requirement. In addition, as a public policy
matter, increased disclosure obligations may have the effect of deterring employers from
offering early retirement windows, which may result in more layoffs.”).
107. Id.; Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 223 F. 3d 286, 294–95 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Under
ERISA, for example, a fiduciary may have financial interests adverse to beneficiaries, but
under trust law a ‘trustee “is not permitted to place himself in a position where it would be for
his own benefit to violate his duty to the beneficiaries.”‘”).
108. Melissa Elaine Stover, Maintaining ERISA’s Balance: The Fundamental Business
Decision v. The Affirmative Fiduciary Duty to Disclose Proposed Changes, 58 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 689, 715–17 (2001) (“The fiduciary duty provisions are grounded in trust law;
however, to protect the balance established between the competing interests of employers and
employees, Congress specifically modified trust law to fit the employee benefit context. Trust
law requires a trustee to have an undivided duty of loyalty to its beneficiaries. This type of
undivided loyalty does not apply to the employee benefit context because ERISA’s prohibited
transaction rules allow a fiduciary also to serve as an officer, employee, agent, or other
representative of a party in interest.”).
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always offer as much protection as the common law of trusts is severely
misguided.
2.

Trust Law Should Not Apply Here with Respect to the Burden of
Proving Causation in a Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Although the common law of trusts will not always be instructive in
ERISA interpretation, there will undoubtedly be times when it is. The “law of
trusts often will inform, but will not necessarily determine the outcome of, an
effort to interpret ERISA’s fiduciary duties.”109 Where ERISA is silent—as it
is in regard to who bears the burden of proving causation—trust law is merely
a starting point to ERISA interpretation.110 Courts will then need to evaluate
whether the trust law provision at issue is consistent with either ERISA’s (1)
purpose or (2) language and structure.111
a.

Trust law’s burden shifting framework is inconsistent with
ERISA’s overall purpose

Although the primary purpose of ERISA is to protect plan participants,112
it is not the only purpose, and trust law’s burden-shifting framework is
inconsistent with ERISA’s overall purpose. Congress understood that an
employer’s participation in the private pension system is voluntary and, in
drafting ERISA, balanced the primary goal of protecting employees’ interests
with the goal of containing pension costs so as not to unduly burden plan
creation.113 As a result, ERISA has two competing purposes: (1) enhanced
protection for employee benefits and (2) incentivizing employers to create
employee benefit plans in the first place.114 Although applying a burden
109. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996).
110. Id.; Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 447 (1999)
(“The common law of trusts, which offers a ‘starting point for analysis [of ERISA] . . . [unless]
it is inconsistent with the language of the statute, its structure, or its purposes.’”).
111. Hughes Aircraft Co., 525 U.S. at 447.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2016) (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to
protect . . . the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries.”).
113. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639 (“The
primary purpose of the bill is the protection of individual pension rights, but the committee has
been constrained to recognize the voluntary nature of private retirement plans.”); see Stover,
supra note 108 at 715 (“Because of the voluntary nature of the private pension system,
Congress drafted ERISA by balancing the primary goal of protecting employees’ interests with
the subsidiary goal of containing pension costs”).
114. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 497 (“[C]ourts may have to take account of competing
congressional purposes, such as Congress’ desire to offer employees enhanced protection for
their benefits, on the one hand, and, on the other, its desire not to create a system that is so
complex that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from
offering welfare benefit plans in the first place.”).
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shifting framework to § 1109(a) would give more protection to the plan
participant, it would essentially create a system wherein a fiduciary would be
liable for all plan losses anytime he breaches any fiduciary duty, even if the
breach was honest or incidental. Such an imposition of liability could have
the effect of deterring plan creation in the first place, leaving ERISA with
fewer plan participants to protect.115 Thus, the common law burden shifting
framework is only consistent with one of ERISA’s purposes—to protect plan
participants. It is not consistent with the balanced purpose of protecting plan
participants, while also encouraging the creation of employee benefit plans.
b.

Trust law’s burden shifting framework is inconsistent with
the language and structure of ERISA

The next step in evaluating trust law’s consistency with ERISA is to look
at whether the burden shifting approach is consistent with the language and
structure of ERISA. It is true that in enacting ERISA, Congress intended to
codify the principles of trust law with whatever alterations were needed to fit
employee benefit plans.116 However, trust law can only apply to ERISA when
its application is consistent with ERISA’s statutory language.117 The statutory
language of § 1109(a) under ERISA requires proof of causation before
liability will be imposed on the fiduciary,118 while the trust law principle at
issue here attempts to impose liability on the fiduciary first, then asks him to
disprove any causal connection between his wrongful conduct and the loss
experienced by the plan.119 The direct collision between these two ideas
115. Reich v. Rowe, 20 F.3d. 25, 32 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Exposure not only to liability for
damages but to other forms of liability as well ‘would impose high insurance costs upon
persons who regularly deal with and offer advice to ERISA plans, and hence upon ERISA plans
themselves.’” (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993))).
116. Free v. Briody, 732 F.2d 1331, 1337–38 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Our reading of section 1109
is based upon the legislative history of ERISA, which demonstrates that Congress intended to
codify the principles of trust law with whatever alterations were needed to fit the needs of
employee benefit plans.”).
117. Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 223 F. 3d 286, 294 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Although ERISA’s
duties gain definition from the law of trusts, the usefulness of trust law to decide cases brought
under ERISA is constrained by the statute’s provisions.”).
118. Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co. Emp. Stock Ownership Plan & Tr. v. Alerus Fin., N.A., 858
F.3d 1324, 1334 (10th Cir. 2017); Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 361 (4th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Plasterers’ Local Union No. 96 Pension Plan v. Pepper, 663 F.3d 210, 217
(4th Cir. 2011) (“A breach of fiduciary duty ‘does not automatically equate to causation of loss
and therefore liability,’ and consequently a ‘fiduciary can only be held liable upon a finding
that the breach actually caused a loss to the plan.’”)); Willett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Ala., 953 F.2d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Section 409 of ERISA establishes that an action
exists to recover losses that ‘resulted’ from the breach of a fiduciary duty; thus, the statute does
require that the breach of the fiduciary duty be the proximate cause of the losses claimed.”).
119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 100 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
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necessitates a finding that the common law of trusts, in this instance at least,
is inconsistent with the language and structure of ERISA.
c.

The inherent differences between trusts and employee benefit
plans justify leaving the burden of proof as to causation with
the beneficiary of the employee benefit plan

In addition to the inconsistencies between the common law of trusts’
burden shifting framework and ERISA, there are fundamental differences
between trusts and the types of benefit plans contemplated by ERISA. These
differences justify less onerous liability for an ERISA fiduciary than that
imposed on a common law trustee, and weigh in favor of trust law’s
inapplicability in the ERISA context.
ERISA, while providing more protection to plan participants than the
common law of trusts, also provides more benefits to the fiduciary. Because
the creation of benefit plans under ERISA is voluntary, plans will not be
created unless they are in the mutual interest of the employer and employee.120
Among these mutual benefits is the deferment of tax payments,121 the
reduction in the total cost of labor,122 and cheaper costs associated with health
insurance plans.123 Additionally, the creation of benefit plans gives employers
a greater ability to attract and retain employees.124 These benefits result from
a congressional intent to incentivize plan creation.125 Trusts, on the other hand,

120. Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1117 (1988) (“Pension and other benefit plans
will not be established unless they are in the mutual interest of employers and employees. Plans
are strictly voluntary arrangements. Neither ERISA nor the tax code nor the labor laws require
the firm to offer any of these plans as a condition of employment. Vast numbers of firms,
especially smaller firms in the retailing, service, and agricultural industries, have no plans or
have skimpy ones.”).
121. Id. at 1117–18 (“Among the mutual interests of employers and employees that lead to
the creation of plans, two stand out. First, compensation in the form of pension benefits is tax
advantaged. Most forms of contribution to pension accounts are tax deferred, meaning that
income tax is paid not when the employee earns the money that is contributed to his account,
but years later when the money is drawn down for distribution[.]”).
122. Id. at 1118 (“Tax advantages aside, benefit plans, especially pension plans, may
reduce the overall cost of labor. For example, pension eligibility and forfeiture requirements,
to the extent that ERISA still permits them, reduce employee turnover and thus enable
employers to economize on recruitment and training costs.”).
123. Id. (“Similarly, group insurance plans, through which a firm buys life, health, accident,
or other coverage for its workers and their dependents, offer significant economic advantages
over individual policies, primarily by reducing sales, underwriting, and administrative costs.
The gains from reduced labor costs as well as from the tax subsidy will be shared in some
fashion by employers and employees.”).
124. Collins, supra note 106, at 408.
125. Id.
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do not provide these benefits to their trustees.126 In fact, trust law contemplates
a disinterested trustee with no incentive to make decisions in the best interest
of trust funds or beneficiaries.127
Furthermore, due to the nature of trusts, their settlors and beneficiaries
are less likely to monitor them, and thus more burdensome liability is
warranted. 128 Trusts sometimes involve a donative intent, or a gift by a settlor
who has died or is not around to supervise and monitor the trustee.129 Many
times, the beneficiary of a trust will be one whom the settler is “wary of
transferring complete ownership and dominion over property or funds,” such
as one who is incapacitated, immature, or not financially savvy.130 In
comparison to the mutually beneficial creation of an employee benefit plan,
with parties who have the incentive and means by which to monitor the
plan,131 the parties at issue in a trust arrangement, one of which may be
unascertainable, are much less likely to be in a position to monitor the actions
of the trustee.132
C.

Public Policy Favors Leaving the Burden of Proof with the Plaintiff

As mentioned previously, one of Congress’s goals in enacting ERISA
was to balance the interests of the fiduciary with that of the plan participant
in order to incentivize the creation and growth of employee benefit plans.133
Courts should be hesitant to disturb this balance.134 One of the issues
originally holding back the enactment of ERISA was the concern that
stringent standards might impede plan growth.135 Congress believed if liability
was too easily imposed on an employer/fiduciary, employers might not even
offer employee benefit plans in the first place, and employer participation in
126. Id.
127. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 120, at 1131.
128. Id. at 1114.
129. Id. at 1113.
130. Id. at 1113–14.
131. Id. at 1119.
132. Id. at 1114.
133. Siskind v. Sperry Ret. Program, 47 F.3d 498, 505 (2nd Cir. 1995) (“One of Congress’
purposes in adopting ERISA was to further the formation of retirement benefit plans.”); See
H.R. REP. NO. 93-533 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639 (“The primary
purpose of the bill is the protection of individual pension rights, but the committee has been
constrained to recognize the voluntary nature of private retirement plans.”).
134. Reich v. Rowe, 20 F.3d. 25, 32 (1st Cir. 1994) (“We will normally not attempt to
adjust the balance between the competing goals of protecting employees’ interests and
containing pension costs that Congress has struck in the ERISA statute.”).
135. H. R. REP. NO. 93-533 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4643 (discussing
the fact that plan growth was a major concern in enacting ERISA, and in fact, one of the things
holding back its enactment in the first place was the wide concern that these standards might
impede growth).
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employee benefit plans was essential for the success of the plans and the wellbeing of American workers. 136 Thus, although some degree of employer
liability was necessary to protect plan participants, it was important to
determine how easily liability should be imposed without driving sponsoring
employers “to the brink of bankruptcy, impos[ing] substantial economic
hardship, or discourag[ing] the establishment of plans or the reasonable
liberalization of benefits.”137 ERISA “represents an effort to strike an
appropriate balance” between the needs and interests of employers in creating
and managing employee benefit plans and the needs of employees for the
adequate protection of their rights.138
V. CONCLUSION
Once the plaintiff in an action for breach of fiduciary duty has proven
(1) the fiduciary breached one of the duties enumerated in ERISA and (2) the
employee benefit plan has incurred a loss, it is erroneous to create a
presumption in favor of the plaintiff that shifts the burden of proving
causation to the fiduciary. The ordinary default rule is that the plaintiff bears
the burden of proving his claim, and in the absence of any statutory language
or legislative history to the contrary, it is inappropriate to create an exception.
Although the common law of trusts creates such an exception to the default
rule, it should not apply here in contradistinction to the plain language of the
statute. The common law of trusts, while serving as the foundation upon
which ERISA was created, contemplates a trustee/beneficiary relationship
that is inherently different from that created under ERISA. This fact, together
with the statutory structure of ERISA, supports the conclusion that ERISA is
not required to provide the same protection to beneficiaries as that provided
under common law.
136. Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 517 (2010) (“Congress sought ‘to create a
system that is [not] so complex that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly
discourage employers from offering [ERISA] plans in the first place.’” (quoting Varity Corp.
v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996))).
137. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 3–5, 11–13 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4654; Reich, 20 F.3d. at 32 (“Exposure not only to liability for damages but to other forms of
liability as well ‘would impose high insurance costs upon persons who regularly deal with and
offer advice to ERISA plans, and hence upon ERISA plans themselves.’” (quoting Mertens v.
Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993))).
138. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 3–5, 11–13 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4647.
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Additionally, there is evidence of a congressional intent to balance the
interests of the beneficiary with those of the administering fiduciary, and
although the primary purpose of ERISA is to protect the beneficiaries of
employee benefit plans, this does not mean every dispute of ERISA
interpretation must be resolved in favor of the beneficiary. Doing so would
create an undue burden on plan fiduciaries and discourage employers from
sponsoring employee benefit plans.
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